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Tax-Free Corporate Exchanges in the
Louisiana Income Tax Law
M. G. DAKIN*
In 1934, spurred by the need for additional revenue, the
Louisiana legislature added an income tax law' to the State tax
structure. As had been the case in other states,2 the federal in-
come tax acts were leaned upon heavily by the Louisiana drafts-
men. In substantial portions of the taxing act, however, they not
only used the federal statutes as a model but copied numerous
sections verbatim. As a result of this procedure, the Louisiana
statute contains all of the intricate and litigious sections of the
federal statute devoted to the non-recognition of gains or losses
in connection with exchanges of corporate stock and assets. In
view of this fact the history of these sections in the federal
statute is relevant and instructive. Imbedded in this history lie
fundamental limitations which have dictated the language of the
statutes.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF "REALIZATION"
A review of certain early decisions of the United States
Supreme Court is fundamental to an understanding of the sec-
tions dealing with recognition of capital gains and losses. In these
cases the Court worked out the limitations of the term income as
it is used in the Sixteenth Amendment.8
Although income taxes of a minor nature had been accepted
as within the taxing power of the United States since the War
between the States,4 the Supreme Court, in Pollock v. Farmers
* Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Louisiana State Uni-
versity.
1. La. Act 21 of 1934, as amended by La. Acts 2 of 1934 (1 E.S.), 7 of
1934 (2 E.S.), 21 of 1935 (1 E.S.), 11 of 1935 (3 E.S.), and 26 and 143 of 1936.
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.1 et seq.). For a discussion of jurisdictional and
retroactive aspects of the Act see Weinmann, The Louisiana Income Tax
Law (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 566. No parts of the Act have yet been in-
terpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
2. Okla. Sess. Laws (1935) c. 66.
3. U.S. Const. Amend. XVI.
4. Stockdale v. Insurance Companies, 87 U.S. 323, 22 L.Ed. 348 (1873).
Cf. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 26 L.Ed. 253 (1880), in which the
Supreme Court held that an income tax is an indirect tax and that direct
taxes, within the Constitution, are capitation taxes and taxes on real estate.
See Powell, Stock Dividends, Direct Taxes, and the Sixteenth Amendment
(1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 536, 537.
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Loan & Trust Co.,' found a fatal flaw in this long accepted rev-
enue device. The Supreme Court in that case established over
vigorous dissents that a tax on the income from property, though
theretofore unchallenged, was a direct tax on property and hence
subject to the constitutional requirement of apportionment.6 The
decision met with subsequent widespread disapproval. This pub-
lic disfavor prompted the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment
in 1913. The amendment has been aptly referred to as a recall
of the Pollock decision.7 Those who framed the amendment to
the fundamental law, however, concerned as they were with the
immediate problem at hand, failed to use language as broad in
its terms as the implications of the Pollock decision.8 As a result,
the amendment exempted taxes on income from the rule of
apportionment but left intact the prohibition of other direct
taxes, such as those on capital value.10 The effect was to raise as
a constitutional issue1 the litigious question of the distinction
between capital and income. Out of this history important con-
cepts developed, one of which concerned the constitutionality of
an income tax which operated retroactively to cover the period
before legislative enactment. The Court conceived of income as
a flow of wealth to which the taxpayer had had no previous
claim;12 hence profits accrued prior to the amendment but col-
lected afterwards could not be brought within this concept of
income. 13 The federal judiciary was consequently forced into the
artificial position that such profits were converted into capital at
that date, and any tax upon them would be a capital levy and
invalid unless apportioned.14
5. 157 U.S. 429, 15 S.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759 (1895).
6. 157 U.S. at 583, 15 S.Ct. at 690, 39 L.Ed. at 820.
7. Powell, op. cit. supra note 4, at 533.
S. The Sixteenth Amendment freed income taxes of the requirement of
apportionment; they still remained direct taxes under the decision in the
Pollock case. See Amberg, Retroactive Excise Taxation (1924) 37 Hary. L.
Rev. 691, 695.
9. U.S. Const. Amend. XVI: "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumer-
ation."
10. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 15 S.Ct. 673, 39
L.Ed. 759 (1895).
11. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).
12. "'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to Include profit
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets . . . ." Justice Pitney in
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).
13. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 38 S.Ct. 537, 62 L.Ed. 1087 (1911); Mer-
chants Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 41 S.Ct. 386, 65 L.Ed.
751 (1921).
14. The limitations upon this position are discussed infra, p. 215. See Rott-
schaeffer, The Minnesota State Income Tax (1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 93, 124.
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Corporate stockholders immediately relied upon this prin-
ciple as a basis for claiming exemption from tax for dividends
paid out of profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913. Logically,
this portion of a dividend came within the protection of the
Pollock case as a claim converted into capital before the effective
date of the Sixteenth Amendment. The Court, however, in the
case of Lynch v. Hornby'5 evolved the argument that income, as
conceived in the Revenue Act of 1913, was an individual concept
which did not embrace the profits accruing to a corporation until
they were actually paid to the stockholder in the form of divi-
dends; thus only upon severance from the corporation did they
form a part of the stockholder's annual income. Two years later,
in the case of Eisner v. Macomber,6 when the Court was asked
to pass upon the taxability of stock dividends, it is evident that
the effects of this decision could hardly be avoided. In the Hornby
case severance of income from capital was regarded as the event
upon which taxability would turn and there had thus been made
available for taxation a large amount of apparently exempt in-
come. The Court could hardly now upset this decision to save
stock dividends, in which there was clearly no severance, even
though they might indicate a net economic gain to the taxpayer.
In the Macomber case much emphasis was placed on the language
of the amendment to the effect that the tax is on "incomes from
whatever source derived."17 The Court found it impossible to
bring within this concept the receipt of stock certificates which
evidenced merely that the profits of the corporation had been
reinvested for the stockholder and which gave him nothing out
of the assets for his own use and benefit. The Court treated as of
no consequence the fact that the stockholder had something
which he could sell and which could very well measure a
real increase in economic wealth, although dissenting Justice
Brandeis 18 argued this vigorously.
In the cases of United States v. Phellis 9 and Rockefeller v.
United States" which followed later, the Court further refined
this idea of severance of income from capital as the criterion of
whether the income was within the amendment. In those cases
a part of the corporation's assets were transferred to new cor-
porate entities and the stock distributed to the stockholders of
15. 247 U.S. 339, 38 S.Ct. 543, 62 L.Ed. 1149 (1918).
16. 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).
17. U.S. Const. Amend. XVI.
18. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 226, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).
19. 257 U.S. 156, 42 S.Ct. 63, 66 L.Ed. 180 (1921).
20. 257 U.S. 176, 42 S.Ct. 68, 66 L.Ed. 186 (1921).
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the old corporations. The assets transferred represented accumu-
lations out of profits. It was argued that here, as in the Macomber
case, 21 there was no severance, since the stockholders received
only certificates evidencing a somewhat changed form of their
investment. The Court held, however, that the creation of new
corporate entities represented by the new stock and the new
property rights and interests said to accompany them, was a
change which constituted a severance from the original capital
and hence rendered the gain taxable.2 2 In the subsequent case of
Weiss v. Steam 28 an existing corporation was dissolved after
transferring its assets to a new corporation for stock and cash,
which was in turn distributed to the old stockholders. It was
there held that, as to the stock received, no gain or loss would
be recognized, presumably because there had been no severance
and the stockholder had nothing different from what he there-
tofore owned.2 4
The decision in Marr v. United States2 5 followed the next
year. In that case stock in an old corporation was exchanged for
stock in a new concern organized in another state. The assets of
the old corporation were transferred, and the company was dis-
solved. The gain on the exchange was held taxable on the ground
that the amount of new stock received in excess of the old capital-
ization was a distribution of income earned by the old corpora-
tion. A point was also made of the fact that the new corporation
was organized in a different state with essential differences in
stockholders' rights and interests. These factors, in the eyes of
the Court, warranted the conclusion that the stockholders had
received something differing in substance from what they prev-
iously had; hence that there had been a severance from the orig-
inal capital.
To the practitioner, whose recompense depended upon cor-
rectly forecasting the non-taxability of an exchange, the task of
so engineering the exchange as to avoid the recognition of gain
was thus fraught with unmarked pitfalls. Several years before
these unsettling decisions were handed down, however, Congress
had already become cognizant of the dissatisfaction with the un-
certain status of reorganizations for taxation purposes, and in
21. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).
22. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 173, 42 S.Ct. 63, 66 L.Ed. 180
(1921).
23. 265 U.S. 242, 44 S.Ct. 490, 68 L.Ed. 1001 (1924).
24. Eisner v. Macomber, 257 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).
25. 268 U.S. 536, 45 S.Ct. 575, 69 L.Ed. 1079 (1925).
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the Act of 1918 they were for the first time specifically listed as
tax-free exchanges.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
To justify the non-recognition of gain, federal legislators
argued that legitimate and needed adjustments in business were
being held up as a result of the threat of high surtaxes which
would fall upon what were termed merely paper profits. The
1918 Act, therefore, carried the first provision for the non-
recognition of gain on stock received on reorganization. 26 The
practice of recognizing as taxable ordinary exchanges involving
the receipt of property which had a market value, however, was
continued. The exemption was limited to an exchange where the
new stock had the same aggregate par value as the stock for
which it had been exchanged. Any excess of par value in stock
received was regarded as taxable.27 This was the forerunner of
what is now Subsection 29 (b) (3)28 in the Louisiana Act.
This provision was continued in the Federal Act of 1921, but
with the par value test eliminated.2" As the provision was worded
in the 1921 Act ° the exemption applied to securities received in
reorganization by a person, in place of securities owned by him.
This was believed to exclude corporations, although the Treasury
26. 40 Stat. 1060, § 202(b) (1918): ". . . But when in connection with the,
reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation a person receives
in place of stock or securities owned by him new stock or securities of no
greater aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur
from the exchange, and the new stock or securities received shall be treated
as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property exchanged.
"When ... the aggregate par or face value of the new stock or securities
received Is in excess of the aggregate par or face value of the stock or
securities exchanged .. .the amount of the excess in par or face value shall
be treated as a gain to the extent that the fair market value of the new
stock or securities is greater than the cost . . . of the stock or securities
exchanged."
27. Ibid.
28. La. Act 21 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.1 et seq.].
29. In connection with the general rule recognizing exchanges as tax-
able, to which the instant provision constitutes an exception, a further limi-
tation was evolved to the effect that exchanges in general would be taxable
only if the property had a "readily realizable market value." (42 Stat. 230,
§ 202(c) (1921). Previously the test had been simply "market value." U.S.
Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 1563. That this limitation proved troublesome is evidenced
by the fact that it was eliminated in 1924 and the general rule enunciated
that all exchanges in which property having a fair market value was re-
ceived were taxable except those specifically excluded: 43 Stat. 256, § 203(a)
(1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (1938). This was the status of exchanges in 1934
when Louisiana enacted the provision.
30. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(c) (2) (1921): "When in the reorganization of one
or more corporations a person receives in place of any stock or securities
owned by him, stock or securities in a corporation a party to or resulting
from such reorganization." (Italics supplied.)
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Department did not so construe it."' To avoid any difficulty on
this score, the 1924 provision was so drawn as clearly to include
exchanges by corporations as well as by individuals. 2 This was
its phrasing as enacted by the legislature of Louisiana in 1934.88
Another type of exchange, common in reorganization pro-
ceedings, was not covered by the wording of the 1921 provision,
namely, exchanges of corporate assets other than stock and secur-
ities for stock and securities. Only exchanges of stock and secur-
ities for other stock and securities were provided for.84 To remedy
this situation there was added to the existing "nonrecognition"
exchanges what is now Subsection 112 (b) (4) in the Federal Act
of 1932 and 29 (b) (4) in the Louisiana Act . 5
The subsection of the federal statute from which Subsection
29 (b) (5) of the Louisiana Act was copied was first incorporated
into the Revenue Act of 1921.8 The section made provision for
those cases where property was transferred to a corporation for
stock and thereafter the transferors were in control of such cor-
poration. The subsection may embrace transfers of stock for stock
which do not fall within Subsection 29 (b) (2) nor are technically
transfers in reorganization under Subsection 29 (b) (3) and 29 (b)
(4). Here again the purpose of Congress was to exempt transac-
tions which constituted a change in form only (from direct hold-
ing of property by individuals to indirect holding through the
corporate device). Much protest was elicited by the 1918 ruling
which regarded a transfer of property to a corporation as a closed
transaction and taxed it as such.87 The 1921 Act consequently
included the provision exempting such transfers. It was so drawn,
however, that a transfer of property to a corporation, even for
cash, was exempt if immediately thereafter the transferors were
31. U.S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 1566(b).
32. 43 Stat. 256, § 203(b) (2) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938): "No gain
or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to
a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged
solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation
a party to the reorganization."
33. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(b) (3) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29], copied
from 47 Stat. 196, § 112(b) (3) (1932).
34. Supra, note 30.
35. If property transferred by a corporation is stocks or securities, it is
of course covered by both Section 29(b) (3) and (4) provided the corporation
is a party to a reorganization. See 2 Paul and Mertens, The Law of Federal
Income Taxation (1934) 152, § 17.60.
36. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(c) (3) (1921).
37. U.S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 1566: "Where property is transferred to a
corporation in exchange for its stock, the exchange constitutes a closed
transaction. .. ."
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in control.8 This gave rise to the amended form in 1924 which
exempted only transfers in exchange for stock and securities.89
This was its form when enacted in Louisiana. 40
The provision for nonrecognition of gain on simple ex-
changes of stock for stock in the same corporation had a similarly
interesting federal history. This provision is now contained in
Subsection 29(b) (2) of the Louisiana Act."1 In the 1921 Act ex-
changes of property held for productive use or investment for
property of like kind were rendered tax free.4 2 As a result, there
was a rush to convert stock and securities, which had advanced
in value, into other stock and securities, since this could now be
accomplished without danger of the gain being taxed.3 To stem
this tide of tax-free conversions, Congress hastily amended the
section to exclude exchanges of all types of corporate stocks and
securities.4 Such exchanges, in connection with reorganizations,
were already provided for elsewhere. 5 By the time provisions
for the 1924 Act were being drawn, however, a reaction to the
amendment was in evidence since it now excluded stock "splits"
and the "cutting of melons" even within the same corporation.
Subsection 29 (b) (2) '1 was the compromise outcome, providing as
it does for exchanges of common stock for common stock, or pre-
ferred stock for preferred stock in the same corporation. On prin-
ciple, this type of exchange could not be distinguished in its effects
from the declaration of a stock dividend and, as in the case of
stock dividends, lack of severance from the capital of any gain
enjoyed would be decisive for nonrecognition in a court test.4'7
38. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(c) (3) (1921): "[No gain or loss shall be recognized]
When (A) a person transfers any property, real, personal or mixed, to a
corporation, and immediately after the transfer is in control of such cor-
poration. .. ."
39. 43 Stat. 256, § (b) (4) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938): "No gain or
loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or
more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation,
and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control
of the corporation .. "
40. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(b) (5) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29], copied
from 47 Stat. 196, § 112(b) (5) (1932).
41. Copied from federal act, 47 Stat. 196, § 112(b) (2) (1932).
42. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(c) (1) (1921).
43. House Ways and Means Comm. Rep. No. 1432, 67th Cong., 3rd and
4th Sess. (1923) 1.
44. 42 Stat. 1560, c. 294 (1921).
45. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(c) (2) (1921).
46. La. Act 21 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.1 et seq.], copied from
47 Stat. 196, § 112(b) (2) (1932), formerly 43 Stat. 256, § 203(b) (1) (1924), 26
U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938).
47. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).
1940]
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFINITIONS OF REORGANIZATION
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS
A separate subsection devoted to the definition of terms was
first included in the Federal Act of 1924.48 The meaning there
assigned to "reorganization," as used in the statute, remained
unchanged through the Act of 193241 when Subsection 29 (g) (1)
in the Louisiana Act was copied therefrom. As set out in 1924 the
provision read:
"Sec. 203 (h) (1) .. The term reorganization means (A)
a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one
corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at
least a majority of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the
properties of another corporation), (B) a transfer by a cor-
poration of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if
immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockhold-
ers or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets
have been transferred, (C) a recapitalization, (D) a mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization, however
effected."
Parts (A) and (B) of the definition merit treatment at some
length because of the controversy over what they were intended
to include. In copying this provision from the Federal Act of 1932
the Louisiana draftsmen, either by accident or intention, omitted
the parenthetical illustrations which are set out in Part (A).5o
They were included only in the Louisiana Rules and Regula-
tions.8 1 The status of the illustrations as law is therefore subject
to serious question.
Reserving for a time all consideration of the legal status of
this subdivision in Louisiana, an examination of federal interpre-
tations of the subdivision will indicate its troublesome character.
The difficulty in applying it stemmed from a desire on the part
of the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts not to nullify the
subdivision which immediately followed it.52 Part (B) included
as a reorganization a transfer by a corporation of all or a part
48. 43 Stat. 257, § 203(h) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938). Section 203(h) (1)
(A) of this definition was included in the subsection providing for non-
recognition of gain in the case of reorganizations in the 1921 Act. 42 Stat.
230 (1921).
49. 47 Stat. 198, § 112(t)(1) (1932).
50. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(g)(1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
51. La. Rules and Regulations concerning Income Taxes (1938) arts. 181,
178.
52. Minnesota Tea Company, 28 B.T.A. 591, 594 (1933).
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of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the trans-
fer the transferor or its stockholders, or both, were in control of
the corporation to which the assets were transferred. If the two
illustrations included parenthetically in (A) are regarded as con-
stituting statutory types of mergers or consolidations without
regard to generally accepted definitions thereof, it is apparent
that acquisition of substantially all the assets of a corporation
without control will constitute a reorganization under (A)
whereas (B) requires that such a transfer be accompanied by
80 per centum control to qualify as a reorganization.
The theory was evolved by the courts that, since Congress
could not have intended this result, the parenthetical illustrations
could not be construed as reorganizations by themselves, but must
also partake of the nature of a merger or consolidation in the
accepted sense.13 In other words, Part (A) must be dealt with in
its entirety. The parenthetical illustrations could not be viewed
apart from the words "merger or consolidation. '5 4
Although the view of the courts seems the most reasonable
one which could be taken, and retain meaning for Part (B), its
actual application has proven extremely difficult. In the Pinellas
Ice Company case,55 where the language of Part (A) was first
called in question, there was an attempt to qualify an outright
sale of corporate assets for cash and notes, as a reorganization
under Part (A) on the ground that it was "an acquisition by one
corporation of substantially all the assets of another corporation."
The Supreme Court ruled the transaction a simple purchase and
sale and hence outside the category of a reorganization. By way
of dictum, however, the court threw out the cautioning words"
that the statutory definition of "merger or consolidation" contains
some things which are beyond the commonly accepted meaning
of those words although partaking of the nature of a merger or
consolidation. It was this dictum which was applied and de-
veloped by the Board of Tax Appeals when a case 57 arose in-
volving a real clash between Parts (A) and (B). The Minnesota
Tea Company case involved a transfer of corporate assets for
stock and a large amount of cash, neither of which was dis-
tributed to the stockholders of the transferor, nor was this latter
53. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 53
S.Ct. 257, 77 L.Ed. 428 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.
(2d) 937 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1932); Minnesota Tea Company, 28 B.T.A. 591 (1933).
54. Minnesota Tea Company, 28 B.T.A. 591, 594 (1933).
55. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 53 S.Ct.
257, 77 L.Ed. 428 (1933).
56. 287 U.S. at 470, 53 S.Ct. at 260, 77 L.Ed. at 433.
57. Minnesota Tea Company, 28 B.T.A. 591 (1933).
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corporation dissolved. The Board was unable to find a semblance
of merger or consolidation in the transfer and ruled that it did
not fall within Part (A). It did not indicate clearly what factors
were lacking except to suggest that had there been a distribution
of the stock and cash and dissolution of the transferor corpora-
tion, Part (A) might have been invoked on the ground that it
was in effect a merger.58 A true merger, it was noted, necessarily
involves new shares to the stockholders representing properties
in which theretofore they had no interest. Clearly this factor was
lacking here, since the shares were not distributed to the stock-
holders. Apparently either distribution of new stock by the trans-
feror or distribution and dissolution of the transferor corporation
are necessary to give the transaction a semblance of merger or
consolidation. 9 In a companion case60 a corporation acquired a
majority of all the stock of another corporation in return for
stock, and both corporations continued their existence with no
dissolution of the old corporation contemplated. Here also the
Board held that the transfer did not partake of the nature of a
merger or consolidation and Part (A) could not be invoked.6 1
Unfortunately the draftsmen of the Louisiana Act copied this
definitive subsection before it was clarified in the Act of 1934.
However, they did not include the troublesome parenthetical
illustrations in their copy.62 As noted above, these were added
only in the regulations, 3 and their appearance even here is per-
haps a result of inadvertence in copying the article from Federal
Regulations. The State authorities, therefore, could avoid the
federal confusion by deleting the illustrations from the Regula-
tions, leaving as Part (A) simply the words "merger or consoli-
dation." These terms could then be given their generally accepted
meaning which would normally entail no conflict with Part (B).
Even if the illustrations are allowed to remain in the Regulations,
their authority is doubtful since they entail an expansion of the
terms beyond their commonplace meaning. This the law makers
would be presumed not to intend.6 '
Congress attempted a solution by amending the definition in
the 1934 Act to read:6 "the term reorganization means (A) a
58. 28 B.T.A. at 596.
59. Ibid.
60. John J. Watts, 28 B.T.A. 1056 (1933).
61. 28 B.T.A. at 1065.
62. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(g)(1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29).
63. La. Rules and Regulations concerning Income Taxes (1938) arts. 181,
178.
64. Bishop v. State, 149 Ind. 223, 230, 48 N.E. 1038, 1042 (1898).
65. 48 Stat. 705, § 112(g)(1) (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1938).
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statutory" merger or consolidation or, (B) the acquisition by one
corporation in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock
of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per
centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock
of another corporation; or of substantially all the properties of
another corporation." The remainder of the definition was re-
tained unchanged except for the change in subdivision lettering.
If a transfer now comes within the language of the new sub-
division (B) it will constitute a reorganization, regardless of
whether it partakes of the nature of a merger or consolidation.
The amendment does more than merely remove the parenthesis
and give the illustrations a separate subdivision letter. The
property exchanged by the acquiring corporation must now be
voting stock. Furthermore, if the acquisition is stock, it must
consist of 80 per centum of the voting stock and 80 per centum
of all other classes of stock. Previously, in the 1932 Act, there
was no stipulation that the acquiring corporation must part with
any stock; the acquisition of a majority of the voting stock and
a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock was all that was required. Consequently, had not the limi-
tation as worked out by the Board6 7 been applied, paragraph (A)
would clearly have nullified the requirement in (B) of the 1932
Act that there must be 80 per centum control after the transfer of
assets to another corporation. As a result of the amendments the
new (B) is limited to acquisition of stock by a corporation in
exchange for its own voting stock. The new (C) [1932 (B) un-
changed] as previously, defines a transfer of any corporate
property to another corporation, as a reorganization so long as
immediately thereafter there is the requisite control. The new
(B) is obviously necessary since a corporation's own voting stock,
even though held as treasury stock, can not rightly be deemed
a corporate asset and consequently such an exchange would not
be included in the new (C).
The remainder of the definitive subsection68 has been retained
66. The injection into (A) of the term statutory raises new problems,
since a reorganization under this definition may be effected by a corporate
rearrangement satisfying the requisites of the state of incorporation. The
federal authorities must consequently be in a position to pass upon the merits
of any such rearrangement which is alleged to meet the statutory requisites
of a state or territory. Where the state of Incorporation lays down no statu-
tory rule as to the steps necessary to consummate a merger or consolidation,
resort must still be had to general judicial definitions of the term. See 2 Paul
and Mertens, op. cit. supra note 35, at 183, § 17.72.
67. Minnesota Tea Company, 28 B.T.A 591 (1933).
68. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(g)(1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
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unchanged in federal acts subsequent to the Act of 1932. The
subsection contains two additional types of transactions which
will constitute reorganizations. "Recapitalizations," listed as Part
(C), was probably inserted in the federal act to cover rearrange-
ments of stock and security rights within the same corporation.
Thus the term would cover exchange of common stock for pre-.
ferred stock and' the exchange of par value stock for no-par value
stock 9 Likewise reduction of corporate capitalization by sur-
render of a portion of stock for cancellation by shareholders who
received no remuneration therefor, would be included here. 0 The
exchange of stocks for bonds has been held to constitute a re-
capitalization.7 1 But the exchange of old bonds for new in a
refinancing transaction is not within the purview of this term
on the ground that this constitutes a closed transaction."
Under Subdivision (D) of Subsection 29(g) (1)1 3 is inserted
the catchall phrase "a mere change in indentity, form, or place
of organization, however effected." Under the federal act, this
part of the reorganization definition has not received very ex-
tensive interpretation, due largely perhaps to the fact that most
reorganizations can be brought within one of the more limited
categories.7 4 However, a Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
exchange of all the stock of a corporation in return for all the
stock of a newly organized corporation, where the assets of the
old corporation were then transferred to the new corporation and
the old one dissolved, constitutes a mere change in identity. 5
Exchange of voting trust certificates for free stock in the same
corporation would likewise constitute a mere change in form."
Reincorporation in a new state, where such reincorporation and
exchange of stock did not too materially affect shareholders'
rights, would probably also constitute a mere change in place of
reorganization and constitute a tax-free reorganization. 77
Only a part of the federal definition of "a party to a reorgan-
ization" was taken over by the Louisiana draftsmen in the second
paragraph of the subsection 8 defining a reorganization. This part
69. H. E. Muchnic, Adm'r, 29 B.T.A. 163 (1933).
70. Benjamin W. Fredericks, 21 B.T.A. 433 (1930), affirmed under the
title of Kistler v. Burnet, 58 F.(2d) 687 (C.C.A. D.C. 1932).
71. Lelia S. Kirby, 35 B.T.A. 578 (1937).
72. I. T. 2035, II-1 Cum. Bull. 55 (1924).
73. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(g)(1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
74. 2 Paul and Mertens, op. cit. supra note 35, at 209, § 17.82.
75. Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.(2d) 150 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1934).
76. I. T. 2292, V-1 Cum. Bull. 12 (1926).
77. 2 Paul and Mertens, op. cit. supra note 35, at 209, § 17.82.
78. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(g) (2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
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of the law presently reads "The term 'a party to a reorganization'
includes a corporation resulting from a reorganization." The
deleted portion of the federal act7 9 continued ". . . and includes
both corporations in the case of an acquisition by one corporation
of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of an-
other corporation." The reason for this deletion is not apparent.
If the legislators intended to limit the meaning of the term, their
idea has not been adhered to in the Louisiana Rules and Regula-
tions. This is evidenced by the fact that the article ° commenting
on this definitive subsection includes the deletion referred to and
adds a word of explanation to the effect that "the definition is
not an all-inclusive one, but simply enumerates certain cases
with respect to which doubt might arise."'
The view that the definition is not all-inclusive has been
voiced by the United States Board of Tax Appeals in interpreting
the federal act. The Board has pointed out that the term "party
to a reorganization" is not actually defined in the statute but that
certain cases are simply enumerated. If the enumeration were
regarded as all-inclusive, it would be extremely limiting. 2 In the
case before the Board at the time, Company A had acquired all
the assets of Company B for stock and cash. The question was
whether Company B was a "party to a reorganization." Answer-
ing in the affirmative, the Board took the view that though Com-
pany B was not expressly included, it was clearly a party to a
merger, and that both parties to the merger must of necessity be
parties to the reorganization of which the merger was the founda-
tion.8 3
Since the Louisiana law simply states that "a corporation
resulting from a reorganization shall be included in the defini-
tion," the Louisiana courts may likewise adopt the view that
this was merely inserted in the law to insure that such a corpora-
tion would not be omitted as a "party." Under such an interpre-
tation they would be free to follow federal decisions as to who
are deemed "parties."
Cases have arisen far more complex than those which are
listed in the regulations as doubtful cases. The federal authorities
79. 47 Stat. 198, § 112 (i) (2) (1932).
80. La. Rules and Regulations concerning Income Taxes (1938) art. 181.
81. This is simply a copy of the comment as it appears in U.S. Treas.
Reg. 77, Art. 577.
82. John S. Woodard, 30 B.T.A. 1216, 1223 (1934).
83. Ibid. See 47 Stat. 289, § 1111(b) (1932), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1696 (1938).
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have been called upon to determine whether a holding company
was a "party to a reorganization" where it had the stock of one
of its operating companies issued to its stockholders, then de-
posited with a committee and finally exchanged by the committee
for all the stock in a new company which it had organized. The
court held that the holding company was a party.14
There must, of course, result some immediate interest to a
corporation if it is to qualify as a party to a reorganization. Thus,
where an individual transferred his holdings in A and B corpora-
tions to a new C corporation, and thereafter the new corporation
exchanged A and B shares with the E corporation for all the stock
in D corporation, which shares were owned at the time by the
E corporation, it was held that the C corporation was not a party
to a reorganization since it merely exchanged with another cor-
poration stock in two companies for stock which the other corpo-
ration owned, and neither acquired any definite interest in the
other.8 5
The meaning of the term "control" is of considerable im-
portance in the Act.86 This factor must be present to qualify a
transaction as a non-taxable exchange under Subsection 29 (b)
(5) where no reorganization is involved but where there is a
transfer of property to a corporation. It must likewise be present
if a transaction is to qualify as a reorganization under Subsection
29 (g) (1) (B) 87 and ultimately as a non-taxable exchange under
Subsection 29 (b) (4). As presently defined in the Louisiana law,
Subsection 29 (h), 1 control means "ownership of at least 80 per
centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the
total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the cor-
poration." This was the definition which appeared in the federal
acts of 193489 and prior thereto. Some ambiguity was detected in
the phrase "80 per centum of the voting stock" inasmuch as it
was not deemed clear whether this meant ownership of 80 per
centum of the stock entitled to vote or ownership of stock having
80 per centum of the voting power. The latter interpretation is
clearly more meaningful and in keeping with the common sense
connotation of control. However, to avoid any possible contro-
84. Sage v. Commissioner, 83 F.(2d) 221 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1936), reversing
Charles H. Sage, 31 B.T.A. 689 (1934).
85. Bus and Transport Securities Corporation v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 391,
56 S.Ct. 277, 80 L.Ed. 292 (1935).
86. La. Act 21 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.1 et seq.].
87. Discussed supra, p. 220 et seq.
88. Copied from federal act, 47 Stat. 198, § 112(j) (1932).
89. 48 Stat. 705, § 112(h) (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938).
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versy thereunder, the Federal Act of 1936 was changed so as to
make this meaning clear.9 0 The Louisiana Act, although with the
original wording, can be interpreted in accordance with the fed-
eral view.
As noted, a transfer which results in control immediately
thereafter may qualify as a reorganization under Subsection
29 (g) (1) (B) and hence as a tax-free exchange under Subsection
29 (b) (4). However, Subsection 29 (b) (5) recognizes such a trans-
fer as a tax-free exchange without regard to its status as a re-
organization. Why, then, would a corporation desire to use such
a transfer as a reorganization so as to achieve nonrecognition
under Subsection 29 (b) (4) rather than Subsection 29 (b) (5) ? The
reason appears upon examining the scope of Subsection 29 (b)
(4). This subsection grants nonrecognition to any corporate party
to a reorganization where property is exchanged, exchanging.
solely for stock and securities in another corporation which is
a party to the reorganization. Thus, if one transfer by a corpora-
tion of property for stock results in control and consequently
qualifies as a reorganization within Subsection 29(g) (1) (B),
other transfers which are a part thereof but which do not result
in control, will be exempt within Subsection 29 (b) (4) if made
by corporations who are parties to the reorganization. The Claude
Neon Lights case9 ' is a good illustration of a situation in which
the federal counterpart of Subsection 29 (b) (4) was used to this
advantage. There, Corporation A controlled certain patents. To
establish a new unit in the neon light business, Corporation B
was formed to buy out Corporation C which was then functioning
in the territory in which Corporation B was to operate. Corpora-
tion C transferred all its property to Corporation B solely in ex-
change for stock, and was thereafter in control. Consequently this
qualified as a reorganization within Subsection 29 (g) (1) (B) and
as an exempt transaction within Subsection 29 (b) (4). In addi-
tion, however, Corporation A transferred patent rights to B solely
in exchange for stock but without acquiring a controlling in-
terest. The Board ruled Corporation A a party to the reorganiza-
tion since the patents were indispensable to Corporation B's
operations, and exempted the exchange of patent rights for stock
in Corporation B. Such an exchange could not have been ex-
empted under Subsection 29 (b) (5). Only the simple exchange
between Corporations B and C would have been within its scope.
90. 49 Stat. 1681, § 112(h) (1936), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938). See 2 Paul and
Mertens, op. cit. supra note 35, at 207, § 17,80.
91. 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937).
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IV. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR EXCHANGES INVOLVING "BOOT"
In connection with each of the types of corporate exchanges
outlined in Subsection 29 (b),12 the Louisiana act specifies that
in order to qualify for nonrecognition of gain or loss the property
must be exchanged solely for property of like kind. Provision is
also made in Subsections 29 (c) and 29 (d) 3 for those exchanges
which are partially, but not solely, in kind. Gain on such an ex-
change is here recognized but only to the extent of the money
and/or the fair market value of property other than property
permitted to be received tax-free. Without some such provision
an exchange would often be taxable merely because a small
amount of money or property not permitted to be received tax-
free was included in the exchange.
The first attempt to deal with this problem under the federal
law appeared in the 1921 Act.94 That act provided that in an ex-
change involving property and money in addition to property
permitted to be received tax-free, the value of the other property
and money should be deducted from the basis of the property
permitted to be exchanged tax-free. If it exceeded such basis,
the excess was taxable. This method achieved the same result
as under the plan presently used, but usually deferred recogni-
tion of any gain until a final disposition. In 1923 the 1921 Act was
amended to adopt the current method" of dealing with such
92. La. Act 21 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.1 et seq.].
93. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(c)(1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29]: "If an
exchange would be within the provisions of Subsection (B) (1), (2), (3), or
(5) of this Section if it were not for the fact that the property received in
exchange consists not only of property permitted by such paragraph to be
received without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in
amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value
of such other property."
94. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(e) (1921): "Where property is exchanged for other
property which has no readily realizable market value, together with money
or other property which has a readily realizable market value, then the
money or the fair market value of the property having such readily realizable
market value received In exchange shall be applied against and reduce the
basis, provided In this section, of the property exchanged, and if in excess of
such basis, shall be taxable to the extent of the excess. .. "
95. 42 Stat. 1560, c. 294, § 2 (1923): "'. . . But when property is exchanged
for property specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subdivision (c) as
received in exchange, together with money or other property of a readily
realizable market value other than that specified in such paragraphs, the
amount of the gain resulting from such exchange shall be computed in
accordance with subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, but in no such
case shall the taxable gain exceed the amount of the money and the fair
market value of such other property received in exchange.'
96. The present plan in part defeats one of the purposes of tax-free ex-
changes which was to avoid the problem of valuation every time property
is exchanged. If there is "boot" involved, all the property must be valued
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exchanges; recognized gain was limited to the fair market value
of the "boot" received.
In the 1932 Act9 (copied by the Louisiana draftsmen) para-
graph (1) of Subsection 112 (c) 8 makes provision for recognition
of gain where "boot" is involved in specific exchanges. Those so
listed are: exchanges of property held for productive use or in-
vestment, stock for stock in the same corporation, stock for stock
on reorganization, and property for stock where there is control
immediately thereafter.
Paragraph (2)19 of this subsection was added in 1924 in an
attempt to plug a loophole which was brought to light while the
Federal Act of 1921 was in effect. The purpose of the subsection.
can best be illustrated by indicating the type of tax avoidance
which the subsection was designed to circumvent.
Suppose Corporation A has accumulated a substantial sur-
plus which it would like to distribute to its stockholders as a
dividend, but is restrained from so doing because of the surtaxes
which will be levied thereon in the hands of the stockholders.
Under the provisions of the 1921 Act100 a new corporation could
be organized and all the assets transferred to it with the agree-
ment that the stockholders were to receive in exchange stock in
the new corporation plus cash to the extent of the surplus of the
old company. Under the 1921 Act the exchange of stock would
be tax-free. 101 The cash received would be taxable, but only as
a capital gain at 121/2 per centum '02 rather than at surtax rates
which far exceeded this modest percentage.1 0 3
to determine whether a gain or loss has been incurred. This is true even
though such gain, when determined, will be recognized only to the extent of
such "boot." No loss whatever will be recognized. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29
(c)(d) and (e).
97. 47 Stat. 196, § 112(c) (1932).
98. 47 Stat. 196 (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(c)(1) [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 8587.29], quoted in note 93, supra.
99. 47 Stat. 197 (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(c) (2): "If a distribu-
tion made in pursuance of a plan of reorganization is within the provisions
of paragraph (1) of this subsection but has the effect of the distribution of
a taxable dividend, then there shall be taxed as a dividend to each distributee
such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is not in
excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the
corporation accumulated after December 31, 1933. The remainder, if any, of
the gain recognized under paragraph (1) shall be taxed as a gain from the
exchange of property."
100. 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
101. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(c) (2) (1921): "... No gain or loss shall be recog-
nized. . . (2) When in the reorganization of one or more corporations a
person receives in place of any stock or securities owned by him, stock or
securities in a corporation a party to or resulting from a reorganization."
102. 42 Stat. 1560, c. 294, § 2 (1923), quoted in note 95, supra.
103. I.T. 1833, 11-2, Cum. Bull. 25 (1923).
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To eliminate this practice paragraph (2) was enacted pro-
viding that where a distribution "has the effect of the distribution
of a taxable dividend," the distributee shall pay a tax on it as a
dividend, but only to the extent, in the federal law, of his ratable
share of surplus accumulated after March 1, 1913.104 The re-
mainder of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) is taxed as
an ordinary capital gain. In the Louisiana act,10 5 the date from
which the surplus must have been accumulated to come within
the operation of the paragraph is fixed at December 31, 1933.
This paragraph must also be considered as regards its effect
on the rule enunciated in Subsection 115 (c). 106 This latter sub-
section provides that liquidating dividends shall be regarded as
in full payment in exchange for the stock and that the transaction
shall be taxable as an ordinary capital exchange involving gain
or loss. It was argued by the federal administration that this pro-
vision had the effect of taxing liquidating dividends as capital
gains even though the stockholder thereby had returned to him
a pro-rata share of assets which could have been declared as a
dividend. 1°7 The Federal Board of Tax Appeals has held, 0 8 how-
ever, that paragraph (2) of Subsection 112 (c) 109 modifies this
general rule and requires that such portion of a liquidating divi-
dend as represents surplus accumulated since March 1, 1913, shall
be taxable as an ordinary dividend. The effect of this ruling is
to exempt from the normal tax that portion of a liquidating
dividend which it would bear as a capital gain, and subject it
only to the surtax as in the case of dividends generally.110
Although these sections"' were copied by the Louisiana drafts-
men, they might well have been omitted. The tax will be the
same by either procedure under the Louisiana act since there is
no surtax provision and both capital gains and dividends are
taxed at the same rates.112 These provisions, hence, serve no use-
ful purpose in the Louisiana law.
104. Supra, note 99.
105. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(c)(2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
106. 47 Stat. 204, § 115(c) (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 32(c) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8587.32].
107. John S. Woodard, 30 B.T.A. 1216, 1225 (1934).
108. 30 B.T.A. at .1227.
109. 47 Stat. 197 (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(c)(2) [Darts' Stats.
(1939) § 8587.29].
110. John S. Woodard, 30 B.T.A. 1216, 1228 (1934).
111. 47 Stat. 196, 204, § 112(c), § 115(c) (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934,§§ 29(c), 32(c) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8587.29, 8587.32].
112. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.5].
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Subsection 112 (d)113 of the Federal Act was made necessary
to alleviate the double taxation problem arising in connection
with exchanges of property for stock by a reorganizing corpora-
tion.14 Since a corporation is a legal entity apart from the stock-
holders, if it received "boot" in connection with an exchange,
gain would be recognizable to this extent, even though the "boot"
was immediately distributed to the stockholders."' As a conse-
quence Subsection 112 (d) was added and provides that if the
"boot" is distributed in pursuance of the plan of reorganization,
no gain will be recognized"" to the corporation. However, the
threat of double taxation is still present, inasmuch as a failure
to distribute in connection with the plan of reorganization, even
though done independently later, will result in tax, first to the
corporation, and second to the stockholder as a liquidating divi-
dend.17
The Federal Act of 1932 contained an additional provision
dealing with distributions to stockholders which it is pertinent
to mention here. Subsection 112 (g) " provided for the non-
recognition of gain to a stockholder upon the receipt of new stock
distributed pursuant to a plan of reorganization, providing that
the old stock was not surrendered.
113. 47 Stat. 197, § 112(d) (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(d) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8587.29]: "If an exchange would be within the provisions of
Subsection (b) (4) of this Section if it were not for the fact that the prop-
erty received in exchange consists not only of stock or securities permitted
by such paragraph to be received without recognition of gain, but also of
other property or money, then-
"(1) If the corporation receiving such other property or money distrib-
utes it in pursuance of the plan or reorganization, no gain to the corporation
shall be recognized from the exchange, but
"(2) If the corporation receiving such other property or money does not
distribute it in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, the gain, if any, to
the corporation shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the
sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property so
received, which is not so distributed."
114. House Ways and Means Committee Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1924) 15; Senate Finance Comm. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924) 16.
115. 47 Stat. 196, §, 112(c)(1) (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(c)(1)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
116. National Pipe & Foundry Co., 19 B.T.A. 242 (1930). Subsection 112(d)
(1) was Subsection 203(e)(1) in the 1926 Act.
117. West Texas Refining & Development Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.(2d)
77 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933).
118. 47 Stat. 197, § 112(g) (1932): "If there is distributed, in pursuance
of a plan or reorganization, to a shareholder in a corporation a party to
the reorganization, stock or securities in such corporation or in another cor-
poration a party to the reorganization, without the surrender by such share-
holder of stock or securities in such a corporation, no gain to the distributee
from the receipt of such stock or securities shall be recognized."
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This provision was originally made in the 1924 Act,119 alleg-
edly to facilitate the division of corporate enterprises into smaller
units without necessitating dissolution of the original corpora-
tibn. Corporation A might desire to organize Corporation B and
transfer a portion of its assets thereto and distribute the stock
of the B Corporation to the old stockholders. This, however,
would constitute a taxable dividend to the stockholders of A,"20
although they have received nothing more than that to which
their old stock entitled them. On the other hand, had the A Cor-
poration organized two new corporations, transferred all of its
assets to them, and distributed the stock of the new corporations
to the old stockholders in liquidation, the transaction would have
been tax-free.'12 To avoid this anomalous situation, the former
type of transfer was also made tax-free in the 1924 Act.
In providing for this anomaly, however, the subsection added
in 1924 and retained until 1934 resulted in inadvertently deferring
the tax on certain other corporate distributions. Thus, for ex-
ample, a corporation contemplating liquidation might transfer
almost all of its properties for stock and cash to one corporation
and the remainder to a new corporation. Without requiring the
surrender of the old stock, stock in this new corporation could
be distributed to the old stockholders and was tax-free within
Subsection 112 (g).2 Later, the stock and cash received on the
first transfer could be distributed as a liquidating dividend
within Subsection 115 (c) .123 If gain to the stockholders resulted
thereon, tax would be payable, but employment of this method
resulted in rendering taxable only part of the gain on the dis-
tribution of the original assets.' 24
To cope with this problem the 1934 Act 25 omitted the above
provision, despite the fact that the effect was to restore the ori-
ginal anomaly referred to. Although in other parts of the Lou-
isiana capital gains section the Federal Act of 1932 was relied upon,
in this instance the state draftsmen apparently followed the Fed-
eral Act of 1934, and likewise omitted Subsections 112 (g) and 112
119. 43 Stat. 256, § 203(c) (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938).
120. Senate Finance Comm. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) 15.
121. 43 Stat. 256, § 203(b)(2) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938): "No gain or
loss shall be recognized if stock or securities . . . are, in pursuance of the
plan or reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities ....
122. 45 Stat. 818, § 112(g) (1928), same as 1932 Act quoted in note 118,
supra; North American Utility Securities Corp., 36 B.T.A. 320 (1937); Rudolph
Boehringer, 29 B.T.A. 8 (1933).
123. 45 Stat. 822 (1928); La. Act 21 of 1934, § 32(c) [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 8587.32]. North American Utility Securities Corp., 36 B.T.A. 320, 325 (1937).
124. North American Utility Securities Corp., 36 B.T.A. 320 (1937).
125. 48 Stat. 705 (1934).
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(h) 126 which contained the exemption referred to. The Louisiana
Regulations, 127 however, contain explanatory paragraphs com-
menting upon the type of exemption in Subsection 112 (g) .112 The
reglations also provide at some length the basis for gain or loss
upon the subsequent sale of such stock received tax-free in con-
nection with a reorganization. Since the subsection 12 is not con-
tained in the law, the allusions to it in the regulations may be
disregarded. However, Article 193, which provides a basis for
stock so received when subsequently sold, is also referred to and
made applicable in computing gain or loss upon the subsequent
sale of stock received as an ordinary stock dividend.130 This por-
tion of the regulation therefore should be retained.
V. ADJUSTED BASIS OF PROPERTY RECEIVED UPON TAX-FREE
CORPORATE EXCHANGE, SECTION 30
The assumption is sometimes mistakenly made by taxpayers
that there is an inherent advantage in bringing a transaction
within the category of a tax-free exchange on the theory that a
tax saving will necessarily result. This view can ordinarily be
attributed to a confusion of tax-free exchanges with actual tax
exemptions. It was never the intent in the federal acts to grant
exemptions. This is witnessed by the increasingly elaborate pre-
cautions taken in the federal acts for taxing all gain resulting to
the taxpayer upon final disposition of the property, whether that
gain occurred before or after the "tax-free exchange." The actual
purpose was, of course, merely to defer the tax on a gain result-
ing to a taxpayer until that gain was deemed to be realized by
a sale of the property for money or for other property not per-
mitted to be received tax-free.' The object of the legislators
was to defer the tax until realization, without exempting any of
the gain from tax. The statutes accomplished this by requiring
that the new property take the basis of the property for which
it was exchanged."12 This requirement constitutes an exception
126. 47 Stat. 197 (1932).
127. La. Rules and Regulations Concerning Income Taxes (1938). Copied
from U.S. Treas. Reg. 77.
128. La. Rules and Regulations concerning Income Taxes (1938), art. 193.
129. 47 Stat. 197, § 112(g) (1932). Subsection 29(g) in La. Act 21 of 1934
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29] contains the "Definition of Reorganization."
130. La. Rules and Regulations concerning Income Taxes (1938) art. 205.
131. House Ways and Means Committee Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1924) 16. See Jacobson and Johnson, Pyramiding Gains and Losses
through Tax-Free Exchanges (1936) 14 N.Y.U. Law Q. Rev. 59.
132. In the case of gifts the object is accomplished by requiring the
donee to retain the donor's basis, La. Act 21 of 1935, § 30(a) (2) [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 8587.301.
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to the general rule that gain shall be computed on the basis of
cost.3 8 In the case of an exchange, cost normally would be the
fair market value of the property given in payment. The function
of Section 30 of the Louisiana Act is to prescribe the circum-
stances under which an adjusted basis must be substituted for
cost or fair market value by the taxpayer.
As was the case in connection with Section 29, the full sig-
nificance of the Louisiana provision for adjusted basis requires
an examination of its counterpart in the federal law and some
inquiry into the stages through which it passed before attaining
its present form.
The Federal Act of 1918 incorporated the principle of "tax-
free exchanges" only to a very limited degree in connection with
corporate reorganizations.""' As a consequence only a very simple
statement as to the basis of the property exchanged sufficed. The
Act provided merely that "new stock or securities received shall
be treated as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property
exchanged.'1 5 In 1921, exchanges of property held for productive
use or investment and exchanges of property for stock in a con-
trolled corporation'3 6 were added to the list of tax-free exchanges.
No change was then made in the language providing for an ad-
justed basis except in those cases where "boot" was received.1'5
In the 1921 Act and prior thereto, where an exchange in-
volved the receipt of money and property in addition to property
permitted to be received tax-free, the method provided for de-
termining adjusted basis was simply to deduct the fair market
value of such other property from the cost of the property ex-
changed."" The remainder constituted the basis for subsequent
disposition, and if such other property exceeded the cost of the
property exchanged, the excess was taxable. This policy was
changed in the 1924 Act and the method for dealing with ex-
changes involving "boot" which is now in use was evolved. 89
Gain was now to be recognized in connection with exchanges
involving "boot" to the extent of the fair market value of such
"boot." This simply meant that if the value of the property per-
133. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 30(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.30].
134. 40 Stat. 1060, § 202(b) (1918).
135. Ibid. Quoted in note 26, supra.
136. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(c)(1)(2)(3) (1921).
137. Id. at § 202(e). The new basis of computing gain where "boot" is
involved is discussed supra, p. 228 et seq.
138. Ibid.
139. 43 Stat. 257, § 203(d) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938), copied in La.
Act 21 of 1934, § 29(a)(6) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
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mitted to be received tax-free, plus the value of the "boot," ex-
ceeded the cost of the property exchanged therefor, such excess
would be taxable but only to the extent of the value of the
"boot." Previously the value of the "boot" would have had to
exceed the cost of the original property in order for a taxable
gain to result.140 This change made necessary an additional pro-
vision in the subsection dealing with tax-free exchanges gen-
erally. Language was added to the effect that "the basis shall be
the same as in the case of the property exchanged, decreased in
the amount of any money received by the taxpayer and increased
in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss to the
taxpayer that was recognized upon such exchange under the law
applicable to the year in which the exchange was made."'' That
is, if a taxpayer had a farm which cost him $10,000 and he ex-
changed it for a $5,000 farm plus $6,000 in bonds and $1,000 in
cash, his gain would be $2,000 ($5,000+$6,000+$1,000-$10,000=
$2,000). The total gain would be recognized since it is less than
the "boot" ($6,000 bonds, $1,000 cash) which the taxpayer re-
ceives. The formula must provide an adjusted basis for the new
property of the taxpayer from which has been excluded any re-
turn of capital in the form of cash and which will include any
increases in value on which tax has been paid. This is accom-
plished by deducting from the original capital of $10,000 the
$1,000 received in cash and adding the $2,000 gain on which tax
has been paid. ($10,000-$1,000+$2,000=$11,000). In the event
that he later disposes of the farm and bonds for $15,000 cash, the
adjusted basis would be $11,000 and he would then have a tax-
able gain of $4,000. The accuracy of the results can be readily
checked by recalling that he has received in return for a farm
which cost him $10,000 a total of $16,000 in cash or a total taxable
gain of $6,000. He paid tax on $2,000 of this gain at the time of
the tax-free exchange and on $4,000 at the time the farm and
bonds were disposed of for cash.
The problem of apportionment raised in the above illustra-
tion is also provided for in the same subsection: 14 "If the prop-
erty so acquired consists in part of the type of property permitted
by Subsection 29 (b) to be received without the recognition of
gain or loss, and in part of other property, the basis provided in
this paragraph shall be allocated between the properties (other
140. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(e) (1921); quoted in note 94, supra.
141. 43 Stat. 257, § 203(d) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938); now La. Act 21
of 1934, § 30(a)(6) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.30].
142. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(a)(6) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
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than money) received, and for the purpose of the allocation there
shall be assigned to such other property an amount equivalent
to its fair market value at the date of the exchange." Thus the
bonds received would take as a basis their fair market value of
$6,000 and the remainder of the total adjusted basis ($5,000)
would be assigned to the farm. This will normally be the fair
market value of the farm at the date of exchange. Obviously, the
formula does not eliminate the necessity for valuing both the
bonds and the farm since the total value is necessary to a deter-
mination of the gain.1 8
Referring back to the first sentence quoted from Subsection
30 (a) (6) in which the formula for adjusted basis is set out, the
last phrase of that sentence is worth noting: ". . . increased in
the amount of gain ... or decreased in the amount of loss...
that was recognized . . . under the law applicable to the year in
which the exchange was made." The significance of this language
is that the law applicable to the year in which the exchange was
made is involved, not to fix the basis, but only to determine the
amount of gain or loss recognized in that year. This gain or loss
is then added to or subtracted from the basis calculated under
the law in effect, not when the exchange took place, but when
the sale or other disposition occurred."4 Under the present Lou-
isiana Act this language has no significance since the same act
governs both the exchange and the subsequent sale. However,
subsequent changes in basis in later acts would render the pro-
vision important. 1" 5
There were also considerations other than the problems just
discussed which prompted an expansion of the federal provisions
dealing with the "adjusted basis" in tax-free exchanges. The 1921
Act had simply provided that in a tax-free exchange the property
received should be treated as taking the place of the property
exchanged therefor.1 46 However, where the property was ex-
changed for stock in a new corporation it was apparent that this
statement was inadequate to prevent wholesale tax avoidance.
The taxpayer's basis for the new stock received would be, as
143. Supra, note 96.
144. Securities Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.(2d) 330 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1933);
S.M. 2723, 111-2 Cum. Bull. 26 (1924).
145. In the federal law the method of computing a basis as established
in the Revenue Act of 1932 is applied to all property acquired subsequent to
February 28, 1913, and prior to January 1, 1934, thereby injecting a degree of
uniformity into the computation. 48 Stat. 708, § 113(a) (12) (1934), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 113(a)(12) (1938).
146. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(d)(1) (1921).
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contemplated, the cost of the property parted with for stock.147
The basis of the property in the corporation's hands, however,
was governed by the general rule that where a corporation ac-
quires property for its stock, the cost of the property shall be
the fair market value of the stock at the date of acquisition.'
As a consequence, it was possible under the 1921 Act for a tax-
payer, owning property which had largely increased in value,
to organize a corporation, transfer the property thereto, and then
have the corporation sell the property. By this method the owner
paid a tax only on the increase in value while in the hands of
the corporation. 49 Of course the stock received by the owner
could not be sold without incurring a tax on the total gain, but
the proceeds of the sale by the corporation could be distributed
to the stockholder in piecemeal amounts and in taxable periods
when losses could be strategically used to cancel out any gains
resulting. To cope with this situation two new subsections were
incorporated into the Federal Act of 1924, specifically directed
at providing an adjusted basis for property transferred to a cor-
poration in return for stock.1"' Such transfers were also specifi-
cally excluded from the subsection covering tax-free exchanges
generally.',"
The federal draftsmen originally directed their efforts at two
types of exchanges in which property was acquired by a corpora-
tion in exchange for its stock: (1) in connection with a reorgan-
ization in which the same control was continued and (2) in con-
nection with a simple transfer of property to a corporation,
accompanied by control immediately thereafter. These, of course,
are the types of exchanges which had already been rendered tax-
free under previous acts" 2 and are covered in the present Lou-
isiana Act"58 in Subsections 29 (b) (4) and 29 (b) (5). As enacted
in the federal law,1 4 the original of Subsection 30 (a) (7) in the
Louisiana Act read:
"Sec. 204 (a) (7). If the property (other than stocks or
147. Ibid. There would be no difficulty here since the old stock replaced
would have a determinable value in the hands of the individual stockholder.
148. This followed in view of the fact that unissued stock of a corpora-
tion has no value of itself and therefore its value in the hands of the issuing
corporation could not be assigned to the property acquired therefor. See
Jankowsky v. Commissioner, 56 F.(2d) 1006, 1008 (C.C.A. 10th, 1932); Peter
Doelger Brewing Company, Inc., 22 B.T.A. 1176 (1931).
149. G.C.M. VII-1 Cum. Bull. 198 (1928).
150. 43 Stat. 259, § 204(a) (7) and (8) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 113, 114 (1938).
151. 43 Stat. 258, § 204(a)(6) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 113, 114 (1938).
152. 42 Stat. 230, § 202(c) (1) and (2) (1921).
153. La. Act 21 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.1 et seq.].
154. 43 Stat. 259 (1924).
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securities in a corporation a party to the reorganization) was
acquired after December 31, 1917, by a corporation in con-
nection with a reorganization, and immediately after the
transfer an interest or control of 80 per centum or more re-
mained in the same persons or any of them, then the basis
shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor,
increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of
loss recognized to the transferor upon such transfer under the
/law applicable to the year in which the transfer was made."
The companion subsection provided:155
"Sec. 204 (a) (8). If the property (other than stock or se-
curities in a corporation a party to a reorganization) was
acquired after December 31, 1920, by a corporation by the
issuance of its stock or securities in connection with a trans-
action described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of Sec-
tion 203156 ... then the basis shall be the same as it was in the
hands of the transferor ......
Did the new provisions accomplish their purpose? Unhappily
for the tax collectors, only in part. A "stepped-up" basis could not
now be secured by transferring, to a corporation, property other
than stock or securities if the transfer was in connection with a
reorganization or accompanied by control. By a curious inadvert-
ence, however, the federal draftsmen excluded from all three
subsections dealing with basis provision 57 a type of corporate
acquisition rendered tax-free by a specific provision elsewhere in
the law."5 8 No satisfactory explanation has been given for the
parenthetical exclusion of stock or securities in a corporation a
party to a reorganization, from both the sections quoted.159 The
result, however, was to leave a loophole in the law through which
an astute legal craftsman could steer his client to substantial tax
savings.
155. Ibid.
156. Now 48 Stat. 704, § 112(b)(5) (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938) and
La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(b)(5) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.291.
157. 43 Stat. 258, § 204(a)(6)(7) and (8) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 113, 114
(1938).
158. 43 Stat. 256, § 203(b)(2) (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938): "No gain or
loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a
reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged
solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation
a party to the reorganization."
159. House Ways and Means Committee Rep. No. 2, 70th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1928) 18.
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A case passed upon by the Federal Board of Tax Appeals 6"
illustrates the method pursued. P was the owner of an option
on oil lands which had substantially increased in value since its
acquisition. In order to dispose of it without incurring an immed-
iate and sizeable taxable gain, P organized the H Corporation
and transferred the option to it in exchange for all the stock. He
then organized the S Corporation and exchanged the H stock for
all of its stock. A third corporation, the Stires Corporation, was
then organized and P purchased its stock for cash. The Stires
Corporation then purchased all of the H stock from S for cash.
Finally, Stires Corporation dissolved the H Corporation, receiv-
ing the oil option which was its only asset. The Stires Corpora-
tion then sold the oil option and claimed no taxable gain resulted
to it because the option had as a basis in its hands its fair market
value at the time the H stock was acquired by S, at which fair
market value it was sold. The gist of the argument for this new
basis was that the exchange of the stock of the S Corporation
for stock of H constituted a reorganization within Subsection
203 (b) (2)161 and 203 (h) (1) (A) and (2) .162 The exchange was
therefore tax-free. Because of the parenthetical exclusion of stock
and securities acquired by a corporation on reorganization in
Subsection 204 (a) (7) ,'16 however, S Corporation was not limited
to the transferor's basis for the H shares but acquired a new basis,
namely, the fair market value of the stock at the time of the ex-
change. The allegation was further made that this basis continued
in the hands of the Stires Corporation. As a consequence, when
the H Corporation was liquidated and the option acquired by
Stires, the basis likewise was the fair market value of the H stock
at the time it was exchanged for the stock of S. The Board of
Tax Appeals'0 4 sustained this argument with the result that the
Stires Corporation paid practically no tax. P, the original owner,
of course, would not be liable for any tax until distributions were
made by the Stires Corporation.
Congress added new language to Subsection 113 (a) (7)165 in
160. Stires Corporation, 28 B.T.A. 1 (1933), appeal to C.C.A. 2nd dismissed.
161. 44 Stat. 12, § 203(b) (2) (1926), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1938); now La. Act
21 of 1934, § 29(b)(3) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
162. Ibid., § 203(h)(1)(A) and (2); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(g)(1)(A),
and (2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
163. Supra, p. 238.
164. Stires Corporation, 28 B.T.A. 1 (1933). For the opinion on which
the case was based, see G.C.M. 7285, IX-1 Cum. Bull. 181.
165. In 1928 the sections of the Act were renumbered so that § 204(a) (6),
204(a)(7), and 204(a) (8) became § 113(a)(6), 113(a) (7), 113(a) (8). 45 Stat.
818 (1928), 26 U.S.C.A. § 113 (1938).
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the Federal Act of 1928 in an attempt to close the loophole just
illustrated and prevent the acquisition of a "stepped-up" basis
through reorganization. They omitted the parenthetical exclusion
from both Subsections 113 (a) (7) and (8) and added the follow-
ing sentence to Subsection 113 (a) (7):166
"Sec. 113 (a) (7) ... This paragraph shall not apply if the
property acquired consists of stock or securities in a corpora-
tion a party to the reorganization, unless acquired by the is-
suance of stock or securities of the transferee as the consid-
eration in whole or in part for the transfer."
No difficulty in understanding the wording of this amendment
will be encountered if it is 'recalled that Subsection 113 (a) (7)
was originally added in 1924 to prevent the acquisition of a
"stepped-up" basis for property, other than stock, by transfer to
a corporation in exchange for stock. The "step-up" had been
achieved by virtue of the general rule that property acquired by
a corporation for stock took the fair market value of the stock
at the date of the exchange as a basis. This necessarily followed,
since prior to an exchange unissued stock would have had no
value whatsoever. To avoid the application of this rule, Subsec-
tions 113 (a) (7) and (8) provide that the property shall continue
to have the same basis in the hands of the corporation as it had
in the hands of the transferor instead of "the same basis as in
the case of the property exchanged" as provided in Subsection
113 (a) (6). Additional provision for the basis of the stock in the
hands of the recipient was unnecessary since this basis was still
supplied under the general statement of basis in Subsection
113 (a) (6). Only property received by a corporation in exchange
for stock is excepted from this subsection.167 As a consequence,
the type of exchange rendered tax-free by Subsection 112 (b)
(4) 168 is taken care of as to basis under Subsections 113 (a) (6)
and (7). Subdivision (6) provides an adjusted basis of cost of
the property exchanged to the transferor for the stock which is
.166. 45 Stat. 819 (1928).
167. 48 Stat. 706, § 113(a) (6) (1934); 26 U.S.C.A. § 113(a) (6) (1938):
Upon an exchange . . . the basis shall be the same as in the case of the
property exchanged .... This paragraph shall not apply to property acquired
by a corporation by the issuance of its stock or securities as the consider-
ation in whole or in part for the transfer of the property to it."
168. 48 Stat. 704, § 112(b) (4) (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112(b) (4) (Supp. 1938).
This was § 203(b)(3) previously; 43 Stat. 256 (1924), 26 U.S.C.A. § 934 (1925).
"No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganiza-
tion exchanges property, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely
for stock or securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization."
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received, 16 9 and Subdivision (7)171 provides an adjusted basis of
cost to the transferor for the property acquired by the corpora-
tion.
Now if it is recalled that the amendment to Subsection 113
(a) (7) was inserted to bring within the operation of this sub-
division stocks and securities received by a corporation on reor-
ganization in exchange for its own stocks and securities, but
without also bringing in the type of transaction described in
Subsection 112 (b) (4) which already had been cared for, the
significance of the amendment is apparent. Stated conversely, it
would read: This paragraph shall apply to stocks and securities
in a corporation a party to the reorganization, acquired by a cor-
poration in exchange for its stock and securities, but not to stocks
and securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization ac-
quired by a corporation in exchange for property other than its
stock and securities.
The loophole for attaining a "stepped-up" basis contained in
Subsection 113 (a) (8) 17 was plugged simply by striking out the
parenthetical exclusion of "stocks or securities in a corporation
a party to a reorganization," thereby bringing within the scope
of Subsection 113 (a) (8) a transfer of any type of property if,
after the transfer, there was control by the transferor as defined
in Subsections 112 (b) (5) and 112 (h) .. Since this subsection, by
its terms, was limited to property acquired by a corporation "by
the issuance of its stocks or securities," there was no necessity
to specifically exclude the type of acquisition described in Sub-
section 112 (b) (4), namely, the acquisition by a corporation of
stocks or securities in exchange for other property on reorgan-
ization.
If an acquisition by a corporation for stock or securities is
neither in connection with a reorganization 7" nor accompanied
by control' 7 ' by the transferor, the general rule still applies, and
the basis of the property will be its fair market value at the time
169. Faris v. Helvering, 71 F.(2d) 610, 612 (C.C.A. 9th, 1934).
170. 48 Stat. 707, § 113(a)(7) (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 113(a)(7) (1938). "If
the property was acquired . . .by a corporation in connection with a re-
organization.., then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands
of the transferor. .. "
171. 48 Stat. 707 (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 113 (Supp. 1938), quoted as § 204(a)
(8), supra, p. 238.
172. 48 Stat. 704, 705 (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1938).
173. 48 Stat. 704 §§ 112(b) (3) and 112(b) (4) (1934); now La. Act 21 of
1934, § 29(b)(3), 29(b)(4) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
174. 48 Stat. 704, § 112(b)(5); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(b)(5) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8587.29.
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of acquisition. 175 The exchange would not be tax-free from the
standpoint of the recipient of the stock however. If the exchange
resulted in a gain, it would be taxable. In other words, in the
absence of the factor of control or reorganization an exchange of
property for stock would be deemed to be a change in substance
rather than form, and would come within the purview of the
section declaring an exchange taxable unless specifically ex-
cepted.17
16
Denied access to a "stepped-up" basis and its resultant tax
savings, through the relatively easily arranged "reorganizations"
illustrated in the Stires case,17  the professional tax "avoiders"
sharpened their weapons for a new attack on the statute. In the
1928 Act, whether an acquisition by a corporation was in connec-
tion with a reorganization accompanied by control'7 8 or whether
it was a simple transfer with control in the transferor there-
after,17 9 it would be included in the subsections requiring an
adjusted basis only if the statutory definition of "control" was
complied with. As then defined, 8 0 control in both Subsections
112 (i) (1) (B) and 112 (b) (5)111 meant "ownership of at least 80
per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the
total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the cor-
poration."
The theory of attack developed was to arrange a transfer so
that it would come within the confines of one of the tax-free
exchanges as a reorganization182 but with the holdings of stocks
and securities so arranged that the definition of "control," as used
in Subsection 113 (a) (7), would not be complied with. If the ex-
change was excluded from this provision, the general rule of fair
175. Ambassador Petroleum Company, 28 B.T.A. 868 (1933); 2 Paul and
Mertens, op. cit. supra note 35, at 271, 396, §§ 18.19, 18.120.
176. 48 Stat. 704, § 112(a) (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (1934); now La. Act
21 of 1934, § 29(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29]: "Upon the sale or exchange
of property the entire amount of the gain or loss .. . shall be recognized,
except as hereinafter provided in this section."
177. Stires Corporation, 28 B.T.A. 1 (1933).
178. That is, a corporate exchange of stock for stock or property would
constitute a statutory reorganization if the requisite control were present.
45 Stat. 818, § 112(i)(1) (1928): "The term 'reorganization' means . . . (B) a
transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation
if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both
are in control. .. ."
179. 45 Stat. 816, § 112(b)(5) (1928), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1938).
180. 45 Stat. 818, § 112(j) (1928), 26 U.S.C.A. § 113 (Supp. 1938); now La.
Act 21 of 1934, 29(h) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
181. La. Act 21 of 1934, §§ 29(g)(1) (B), 29(b)(5) [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 8587.29].
182. That is within § 112(b) (3) or 112(b) (4), 45 Stat. 816 (1928), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 112 (Supp. 1938).
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market value at date of acquisition would be applicable, with
the desired result of a "stepped-up" basis and a postponement8 3
of tax.
The Handbird Holding Company case 1 84 aptly illustrates this
method of attack. G Corporation wished to dispose of its property
to P Corporation and P agreed to collaborate in a plan to avoid
part of the tax for which G would thereby become liable. G or-
ganized two new corporations, F and H. G then transferred the
assets to F, in exchange for all its stock. This was alleged to con-
stitute a reorganization within Subsections 112 (i) (1) (B) and
112 (b) (4)185 and therefore tax-free. The property in F's hands
consequently would have the same basis as in the hands of the
transferor, G, under Subsection 113 (a) (7).186 The second new
corporation, H, then sold one-third of its stock together with cer-
tain bonds to P Corporation, the prospective purchaser. 187 H Cor-
poration then purchased the assets of G from F, giving in return
two-thirds of its stock and a quantity of bonds. This exchange
was also alleged to be a reorganization within Subsection 112 (i)
(1) (A) and 112 (b) (4)188 and hence tax-free. However, it was
alleged that the property in H's hands could not take the trans-
feror's base under Subsection 113 (a) (7) because F had only
66 2/3 per centum control of the stock and 38 per centum control
of the bonds of H Corporation whereas 80 per centum was re-
quired by the subsection. It was therefore alleged that the assets
in H's hands took the fair market value at date of transfer as a
basis. Finally, H transferred the assets to the P Corporation in
exchange for cash and the stock and bonds previously issued to
P. H then reported as taxable gain the difference between the
fair market value of the property when acquired from F and the
183. A postponement rather than a tax exemption since a sale of the
stock by the stockholder at a later date would result in a taxable gain.
184. 32 B.T.A. 238 (1935).
185. 45 Stat. 818 (1928), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1938); now La. Act 21
of 1934, §§ 29(g)(1) (B), 29(b)(4) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29]; under sub-
division 112(i)(1) (B) there must be statutory control to constitute a reor-
ganization.
186. 45 Stat. 819, § 113(a) (7) (1928); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 30(a) (7)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.30]: "If .. .after the transfer an interest or con-
trol in such property of 80 per centum or more remained in the same per-
sons ... then the basis shall be the same ......
187. In the actual case there was an additional corporation formed by
P to make the purchase, but its elimination does not alter the principles
involved.
188. 45 Stat. 816, 818 (1928); now La. Act 21 of 1934, §9 29(g) (1) (A), (b)
(4) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29]; under Subdivision 112(i)(1) (A) there
need only be acquisition of a majority of the voting and non-voting stock of
a corporation or acquisition of substantially all of its properties to consti-
tute a reorganization.
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value of the cash and securities received from the S Corporation.
The H Corporation was then dissolved, its mission having been
accomplished.
Had the Federal Board of Tax Appeals been left undisturbed
by the Supreme Court, the Board probably would have sustained
the contention of the taxpayer that a "stepped-up" basis had
been legitimately achieved. In the Gregory case'89 two years
earlier the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had argued for
disregarding corporate entities which were created for the sole
purpose of tax avoidance and which were discarded when this
had been accomplished. In that case a statutory reorganization
admittedly was engineered for the purpose of tax avoidance. The
Board there said: 90
"Congress has not left it to the Commissioner to say, in
the absence of fraud or other compelling circumstances, that
the corporate form may be ignored in some cases and recog-
nized in others. Whatever can be said of the wisdom of
recognizing the corporate device, the taxing statutes have so
plainly accepted it and provided the detailed methods of tax-
ing its transactions that to disregard it in a case like this
would vary the time, method, and amount of tax which the
statute imposes."
The Board thus expressly approved the use of the corporate
device to contrive an exchange which would not fall within the
precise terms of the law. Such corporations would not be dis-
regarded even though their only purpose was tax avoidance. This
point of view was an open invitation to tax specialists to pit their
ingenuity against that of the department draftsmen. The Hand-
bird case well illustrates the effects of the challenge.
In the two-year interval between the Gregory case and the
Handbird case, however the Gregory' case reached the Supreme
Court and elicited an opinion which dealt a body blow to reor-
ganization staged solely for tax avoidance. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the Court there, said in part: 9 2
"When [the act] speaks of a transfer of assets by one cor-
poration to another, it means a transfer made in pursuance of
a plan of reorganization of corporate business; and not a trans-
189. Evelyn F. Gregory, 27 B.T.A 223 (1932).
190. 27 B.T.A. at 225.
191. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596 (1935).
192. 293 U.S. at 469-470, 55 S.Ct. at 268, 79 L.Ed. at 599.
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fer of assets by one corporation to another in pursuance of a
plan having no relation to the business of either, as plainly
is the case here... The whole undertaking, though conducted
according to the terms of [the act], was in fact an elaborate
and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes
from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not perti-
nent to the situation, because the transaction upon its face
lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise
would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the
statutory provision in question of all serious purpose."
Two months after the Court had spoken on the Gregory case,
the Board promulgated its opinion in the Handbird Holding Cor-
poration case.19 3 Bowing to the ruling of its superior court, the
Board found that the creation of the F and H Corporations by G
was a subterfuge and bore no relationship to the business of G.
The transfer by F to H, instead of constituting a reorganization,
was held to be a transfer with immediate control thereafter in
the transferor and hence tax-free within Subsection 112 (b) (5) 194
but with the transferor's basis retained under Subsection 113 (a)
(8).111' The temporary holding by the P Corporation of one-third
of the stocks and a part of the bonds so as to defeat the "80 per
centum" clause in the definition of control was brushed aside as
without substance 'inasmuch as P's holdings were relinquished
immediately upon the receipt of the assets from H. Thus the
transfer was held to fall squarely within Subsections 112 (b) (5)
and 113 (a) (8). The result was a taxable gain to H of the differ-
ence between the original cost to G and the total cash received
from P.
The Gregory decision, 196 which was held to control the above
case, has not been interpreted to exclude all reorganizations
which are engineered solely for tax avoidance. Had the Circuit
Court of Appeals decision 97 been affirmed without comment, this
might have been the result since that court said the readjust-
ment "must be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct
of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident, egregious
193. 32 B.T.A. 238 (1935).
194. 45 Stat. 816 (1928); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(b) (5) (Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 8587.29].
195. 45 Stat. 820 (1928); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 30(a) (8) [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 8587.30].
196. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596 (1935).
197. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.(2d) 809 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1934).
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to its prosecution." This statement could well have been inter-
preted thus broadly. However, the Supreme Court limited itself
to those situations where the new corporate entity has no func-
tion other than that of tax avoidance and is "put to death" when
this is accomplished. Presumably a reorganization, though staged
for purposes of tax avoidance, would be validated if it resulted
in new and permanent entities having a real and germane rela-
tionship to the business. 98
When amendments to the Federal Act of 1932 were being
drafted, there was as yet no intimation that the use of corporate
entities, however ephemeral, was not a proper device to circum-
vent the statute. 9 ' Then, too, many reorganizations would still
have qualified, despite the rule in the Gregory case, because,
although launched to save taxes, they nevertheless resulted in
corporations which carried on normal corporate functions."0
Obviously, if in a reorganization of this type friendly capital
could be induced to hold 21 per centum of the stock, so that im-
mediately thereafter there would not be the requisite 80 per
centum control required to force retention of the transferor's
basis under Subsection 113 (a) (7), a "stepped-up" basis could
still be attained.20 1
Advertence to this loophole prompted the draftsmen to lower
the percentage of control required in Subsection 113 (a) (7) from
80 per centum to 50 per centum in the 1932 Act.20 2 This was done
to discourage the so-called 79 per centum and 21 per centum re-
organizations mentioned above. It had this effect, but it also
introduced an additional anomaly into the law. This resulted
because the 80 per centum definition of control was retained in
the definitive subsections of Section 112.203 As a consequence a
corporate exchange was possible which would be taxable to the
transferors and yet would not result in a new basis for the prop-
erty in the hands of the acquiring corporation. An exchange
198. See 2 Paul and Mertens, op. cit. supra note 35, at 140, § 17.48; and
Id. (Supp. 1938) at 52, § 17.48.
199. Evelyn F. Gregory, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932); Stires Corporation, 28 B.T.A.
1 (1933).
200. Specifically exempted by the Court. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465, 469, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596 (1935).
201. The act provides several methods of qualifying a corporate transfer
as a reorganization without necessitating control as defined in the statute.
See 45 Stat. 818, § 112(1) (1) (1928); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(g) (1) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
202. 47 Stat. 199 (1932).
203. 47 Stat. 197, § 112(h) (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(h) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
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based on a reorganization involving less than 80 per centum con-
trol would be excluded from the tax-free exceptions in Section
11204 and hence taxable. If the reorganization involved more than
50 per centum control, however, Subsection 113 (a) (7) forced re-
tention of the transferor's basis in the bands of the acquiring
corporation. 20 5 However, it will not necessarily result that the
gain taxed to the transferor will be taxed again in its entirety to
the transferee upon subsequent disposition because Subsection
113 (a) (7) provides for increasing the transferee's basis by any
gain recognized to the transferor.20 6 The 50 per centum definition
of control was continued in both the 1932 and 1934 federal acts
and was copied into the Louisiana Act by the legislative drafts-
men.
2 0 7
The purpose of Subsection 113 (a) (8),208 the companion sub-
section of 113 (a) (7), has consistently been that of retaining the
transferor's basis where a transfer of property is made to a cor-
poration and there is thereafter control, as specified in Subsec-
tions 112 (b) (5) and 112 (h). 209 There is no necessity for the
presence of reorganization proceedings in order to come within
its terms. It is necessary only that the property acquired by a
corporation must have been received in exchange for stock and
securities.
The provision has received one change since the parenthetical
clause previously referred to 210 was struck out in the 1928 Act.
This change was made necessary as a result of a reversal by the
Federal Board of Tax Appeals of a ruling of long standing in the
Treasury Department. The department had taken the position
that even where no new stock was issued, if the requisite control
was present, property transferred to a corporation by the stock-
holders in return simply for an increase in their stock equity
204. 47 Stat. 197, § 112(b) (1)-(5) (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(b) (1)-
(5) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
205. In the Federal Act of 1936 it was thought to avoid this inconsistency
by eliminating the fixed percentage altogether. 49 Stat. 1683, § 113(a) (7) (1936),
26 U.S.C.A. § 113 (Supp. 1938). It was restored, however, in 1938, 52 Stat. 574,
c. 289, § 807, 26 U.S.C.A. § 113 (Supp. 1938). See 2 Paul and Mertens, op. cit.
supra note 35, Supp. 1938, at 179, § 18.114.
206. 47 Stat. 199, § 113(a) (7) (1932). ". . . The basis shall be . . .increased
in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the
transferor ..
207. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 30(a) (7) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.30].
208. 47 Stat. 200 (1934); La. Act 21 of 1934, § 30(a) (8) [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 8587.301.
209. 48 Stat. 704, 705 (1934); La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(b)(5), (h) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8587.29].
210. Supra, p. 241.
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would nonetheless take the transferor's basis. 211 An adverse
decision2 12 by the Federal Board of Tax Appeals, making possible
a "stepped-up" basis by such a procedure, prompted the addition
in the 1932 Act of a specific subdivision requiring that the trans-
feror's basis be retained by the corporation acquiring property
under such circumstances. 213 It is apparent that the same rule
should govern as to basis whether a corporation actually issues
new shares in return for property or whether there is simply an
increase in the value of shares already held resulting from a
transfer of property to the corporation.
This subsection, in its amended form in the Federal Act of
1932, was taken over by the Louisiana draftsmen as Subsection
30(a) (8) of the income tax law. The Louisiana Regulation's
article2 14 commenting upon this subsection was also copied, in
part, from federal regulations.2 11 The article is, in the main,
simply a restatement of the provision in the law. However, there
is an additional comment which has given rise to considerable
confusion in the federal law. The last paragraph in the article
reads:
"It should be noted that property may be acquired in con-
nection with a reorganization without the provision of Section
30 (a) (7) being applicable, because of the fact that an interest
or control of 50 per cent or more does not remain in the same
persons. If, however, such a transaction falls within the pro-
visions of this section, the limitations imposed herein upon
the basis of such property are applicable."
It is difficult to see how a transfer could fail to be included in
Subsection 30 (a) (7) because the control thereafter was less than
50 per centum, and yet be covered by Subsection 30 (a) (8). This
is evidenced by the fact that the latter subsection provides for
an adjusted basis only if the exchange was tax-free under Sub-
section 29 (b) (5). To qualify as a tax-free exchange under this
provision there must be control immediately after the transfer
and that control must consist of ownership of 80 per centum of
all stock.216 If the transfer meets the "80 per centum" requisite
of Subsection 30 (a) (8), it will have met the "50 per centum"
211. Senate Finance Committee Report No. 665, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess.
(1932) 27.
212. Rosenbloom Finance Corp., 24 B.T.A. 763 (1931).
213. 47 Stat. 200, § 113(a)(8) (B) (1932); now La. Act 21 of 1934, § 30(a)
(8) (B) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.30].
214. La. Rules and Regulations Concerning Income Taxes (1938) art. 192.
215. U.S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art..599.
216. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 29(h) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.29]
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requisite of Subsection 30 (a) (7). A transfer may very well be
included in Subsection 30 (a) (8) although excluded from Sub-
section 30 (a) (7), but the exclusion will usually arise, not because
there is insufficient control, but because the capital readjustment
does not qualify as a reorganization within the new limitations
placed upon that term in the Gregory case 217 and further illus-
trated in the Handbird case.218 This, as a matter of fact, is the
gist of this paragraph as it appears in the new Federal Regula-
tions covering the 1936 Act. 219 The Louisiana Regulations might
well follow this federal correction.
VI. JANUARY 1, 1934 AND MARCH 1, 1913-CONCLUSION
Whatever may be the basis determined under the foregoing
provisions of Section 30 for property acquired prior to January
1, 1934, that basis will be superseded if the value of the property
at January 1, 1934 is greater. Subsection 30 (a) (13) 220 provides:
"In the case of property acquired before January 1, 1934,
if the basis otherwise determined under this subsection, ad-
justed as provided in Subsection (b), is less than the fair
market value of the property as of January 1, 1934, then the
basis for determining gain shall be such fair market value.
In determining the fair market value of stock in a corpora-
tion, as of January 1, 1934, due regard shall be given to the
fair market value of the assets of the corporation as of that
date."
The above provision is a copy of Subsection 113 (a) (13) in
the Federal Act of 1932221 with the date January 1, 1934 substi-
tuted for March 1, 1913. The inclusion of the quoted limitation in
the State Act precipitates the question of the extent to which
such limitation is necessary or desirable. For both Louisiana and
the federal government these dates are the effective dates of the
respective acts. Is it necessary, however, that the effective date
of the State Act fix a point at which all gains accrued up to that
time became converted into capital and immunized from the
operation of an income tax? In view of the mountainous propor-
217. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596 (1935).
218. Handbird Holding Corporation, 32 B.T.A. 238 (1935).
219. U.S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 113(a)(8)-1. The change In this article can-
not be accounted for by the omission from § 113(a) (7) of a fixed percentage
control requirement since there must still be 80 per centum control for a
transfer to come within § 113(a) (8).
220. La. Act 21 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.1 et seq.].
221. 47 Stat. 201 (1932).
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tions of the federal litigation over this distinction, 2 2 it is not
strange that the state draftsmen should attach the same signifi-
cance to the effective date of the Louisiana Act as March 1, 1913
has in the Federal Act. The importance of the latter date, how-
ever, stems not from the fact that it is the effective date of the
first act, but that it is the date upon which the Sixteenth Amend-
ment 28 became operative. The amendment made available for
taxation income which up to that date had been exempt under
the Pollock decision. 22 ' The constitutional restraints upon the
federal government have dictated the interpretation that gains
and profits must "arise" after March 1, 1913 to be taxable without
apportionment. 225 There is no such constitutional compulsion
operative upon the state to distinguish between income arising
before and after January 1, 1934. By definition the Louisiana tax
is levied simply upon "gains, profits, and income ... from sales
or dealings in property . . . arising out of the ownership, or use,
or interest in such property. '12  As a consequence the State is
free to tax the whole gain enjoyed by a taxpayer and arising out
of the ownership of property without regard to the date on which
the property was acquired. If an effective date is to be fixed after
which capital gains are deemed to accrue it might be better to
substitute March 1, 1913 for January 1, 1934 in this subdivision.
This action would eliminate additional valuation problems for
the state and make federal computations available for state use.
Inasmuch as the federal act was probably copied by Louisiana
draftsmen in order to make federal interpretations and appraisals
applicable, the substitution would be a step in the direction of
implementing such application. At present, if a disposition of
property comes within both federal and state income tax laws, a
valuation to fix the fair market value at March 1, 1913, January
1, 1934, and date of acquisition may be necessary. 27
222. See, for example, annotations in 6 F.C.A. (1934) 507, par. 353.
223. U.S. Const. Amend. XVI.
224. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 15 S.Ct. 673,
39 L.Ed. 759 (1895).
225. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 38 S.Ct. 537, 62 L.Ed. 1087 (1918);
Merchants Loan and Trust Company v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 41 S.Ct. 386,
65 L.Ed. 751 (1921).
226. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.81.
227. A full illustration of the methods to be used in arriving at an ad-
justed basis for property acquired prior to March 1, 1913, is set out in U.S.
Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 606. Although in the Louisiana regulations covering
adjusted basis generally, the federal regulations have been copied almost
verbatim, here the Department omitted all reference to the determination
of basis for property acquired prior to January 1, 1934, except in the case
of stocks and bonds. La. Rules and Regulations Concerning Income Taxes
(1938) Art. 198. No reason has been assigned for this step.
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As noted previously, 28 early federal statutory provisions
dealing with the subject of tax-free exchanges were largely Con-
gressional attempts to alleviate uncertainty arising in the judicial
application of the vexatious rule of severance as the criterion of
income. The proliferation of federal statutes on the subject in
later years has been in the main an attempt to plug loopholes
in the law as they have been brought to light. The initial diffi-
culties stemmed, however, from a federal interpretation applied
to a federal constitutional amendment. The states are not bound
by this interpretation of how income shall be deemed to arise
except in so far as they choose to enact it into law. It would seem
that Louisiana, for example, is constitutionally free to adopt, if
it chooses, a much broader definition of income. There is no
necessity, however, for the state to extend its present definition
of income229 in order to tax, if it chooses, all exchanges, since the
state is free to regard the exchange merely as a convenient point
at which to tax the gains which have accrued up to that time.
By definition the state income tax is levied on the "gains . . .
arising out of ownership. ' 2 0 Problems of severance need not
concern it, unless, as at present, it chooses to follow in federal
footsteps. Administrative and equitable considerations may dic-
tate adherence to federal interpretations in the matter of taxing
exchanges; such action on the part of the state is clearly elective,
however, rather than compelled by fundamental law.
228. Supra, pp. 215 et seq.
229. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.8].
230. Ibid.
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